Against Neutrality: Response to Cokelet

We appreciate and respond to Cokelet's thoughtful criticisms of our book. First, he points to deliberative forms of practical wisdom as objectionable to anti-rationalist's. In response, we point to non-conscious (yet complex) forms of deliberation that occur as individuals automatically process and respond to virtue-relevant stimuli. Second, Cokelet states that reflecting upon one's life as a whole may be unnecessary and ineffective for virtue development. We clarify that reflection is not the only means of virtue cultivation, and even flawed reflection is likely helpful. Finally, Cokelet recommends aiming for 'theoretical neutrality' by recasting these core tenets as empirical hypotheses. We argue against a neutral perspective that accommodates antirationalist views that we think are on the wrong track. Non-neutral claims help generate testable empirical hypotheses that can move virtue science forward.

Keywords: Virtue; practical wisdom; moral psychology; virtue ethics; anti-rationalism

In our book, Understanding Virtue: Theory and Measurement (Wright et al., [7]), we set forth a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, integrated with whole trait theory from personality psychology (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, [3]), that keeps with some of Aristotle's claims about virtue, phronesis, and character, sometimes opting for views that we find more reasonable and aligned with the available empirical data, and we present ideas for a robust program of empirical research on virtue science.

In Cokelet's review (Cokelet, [1]), he praises our 'creative and promising proposals' for cultivating a more mature science of virtue, while criticizing our reliance on 'philosophically contentious' claims. Although we appreciate Cokelet's complimentary comments and thoughtful suggestions, we respectfully disagree that our claims are 'contentious', and we argue for a science of virtue that embraces well-reasoned theory while cautioning against Cokelet's call for 'theoretical neutrality.'

We see three main points in Cokelet's critique and respond to each in turn.

Cokelet believes that our account of virtue, and the role of practical wisdom in particular, is too strongly rationalist. He differentiates practical wisdom into non-deliberative (e.g., 'situational comprehension or apt perception') and deliberative (e.g., 'theoretical and practical problem-solving abilities') aspects, and holds that the latter assume levels of conscious reasoning unrealistic for guiding virtue. He suggests removing deliberative forms of practical wisdom from our theory, claiming 'that non-deliberative practical wisdom can help provide action guidance, multiple virtue regulation, and emotional regulation' (three of four roles of practical wisdom discussed in the book).

In response, a brief discussion of what we mean by deliberation may help to clarify. We draw the distinction between conscious and non-conscious/automatic forms of deliberation. What Cokelet calls 'non-deliberative' we are calling non-conscious/automatic deliberation. We do not think deliberation occurs only through conscious, top-down reasoning but often occurs automatically and outside of conscious awareness. Evidence shows that non-conscious processing of complex situations often produces good results (Dijksterhuis et al., [2]; Kahneman, [4]).

Take the professional off-road bike racer, for example, who rides down the face of a mountain. Their brains and bodies are processing (at a pace so immediate as to be unaware that it is happening) huge amounts of incoming stimuli to determine which are the most relevant, which can safely be ignored, and what consequences they have for what action(s) should come next. To call this 'automatic' in no way implies that it is not hugely thoughtful: There is significant processing taking place that is profoundly attuned to (and alterable by) the ever-changing environment encountered. Otherwise, they would be a pile of broken bones at the bottom. Occasionally, they encounter something that makes them reflect 'What just happened?' And at that point conscious analysis, reasoning, problem-solving, and decision-making kick in. And if we went back in time to when they were first training, we would see far more conscious processing as they were learning, talking, observing, trying things out, and incorporating feedback to improve.

This is no different than the view we present, that 'virtuous deliberations or patterns of reasoning can become habitual or routinized parts of our nonconscious processing' (p. 29). At several points, we walk a 'middle line' that weaves together times when we have reasons that we are unaware of, and may not even be able to be aware of, and others when we are able to accurately articulate, evaluate, and share those reasons. Accordingly, some of our measurement suggestions assess more conscious forms of deliberations (e.g., the one that Cokelet identifies on p. 153), but there are others that assess less- or non-conscious forms of deliberation, for example, by tracking changes in individuals' responses in relation to changes in virtue-relevant details presented in vignettes (p. 151), and by measuring habituality as an indicator of non-conscious reasoning (p. 180).

Cokelet also draws from anti-rationalist philosophers and psychologists (David Hume, Michael Slote, Julia Driver, and Jonathan Haidt) to cast doubt upon the idea 'that rational deliberation and reflection can shape our emotions and actions in the ways that Aristotelians hold.' According to these scholars, 'being virtuous is within the reach of uneducated and poorly educated people who lack' sophisticated forms of rationality.

We wholeheartedly agree that uneducated people can and do develop virtue and practical wisdom, in part because non-conscious forms of deliberation are primary and do much of the heavy lifting in guiding action, multiple virtue regulation, and emotion regulation. In the book and elsewhere (Snow, [5]; Snow et al., [6]) we hold that practical wisdom and virtue develop in ordinary people—non-consciously as well as consciously—as they interact with everyday situations and reflect upon the valued ends they wish to achieve.

We agree with Snow ([5]), who charts a developmental pathway to full Aristotelian virtue in which ordinary individuals (a) begin their journeys by instrumentally valuing virtues, giving way to (b) constitutively valuing virtues as broadly helping life go well, eventually transitioning into (c) intrinsically valuing virtues for their own sake. Nowhere in this account are individuals expected to consult with philosophers or pursue degrees in virtue, although the collective wisdom and practical advice of friends and family, as well as their own reflective processes, are expected to facilitate the transition from one phase to the next. This brings us to Cokelet's second point concerning the reflective role of practical wisdom in cultivating virtue.

Cokelet believes that reflection on one's life as a whole (the fourth role of practical wisdom in our book) is not necessary or effective for virtue development.

In objecting that phronetic reflection is not necessary, Cokelet challenges our 'apparent assumption that to develop overall virtue, practical wisdom needs to guide "reflection on one's life as a whole."' To clarify: We do not believe reflection is the only means by which virtue develops—rather, it is the most conscious, top-down way of tuning one's deliberative processing. Indeed, much of virtue development, particularly in the beginning, likely results from reinforcement, modeling and vicarious learning, socialization from more skilled members of a culture, and so on. These processes shape and prune individuals' social-cognitive systems in ways that conspire toward or against the development of virtue and practical wisdom.

In objecting to the efficacy of phronetic reflection for virtue development, Cokelet states, '[S]ome successful people in various professions [may think] that they would have failed more if they were more just or compassionate and [conclude] that they are better off being decent but not overall virtuous and, for slightly different reasons, it is likely that some parents and friends will conclude that they are fulfilling their roles well precisely because they are less than ideally virtuous.'

Reflection on one's life as a whole certainly does not guarantee virtue development, largely because people rarely possess high levels of wisdom. Nevertheless, however imperfect one's phronetic reflection might be, it should generally lean toward supporting virtue development. As individuals informally reflect upon the consequences of vice and virtue, question what matters to them and why, wish they and others were more compassionate, courageous, or trustworthy (even if they don't use those particular words), etc., we assume that such reflections generally conspire toward virtue development.

We also accede that it is conceivable for people to believe they are good parents/friends 'precisely because they are less than ideally virtuous.' However, believing that something is true does not make it true. If a parent's less-than-perfect expressions of particular virtues (e.g., not always telling the truth) contribute to being a good parent (maximally fostering their children's wellbeing), then this simply means that those particular virtues have occasionally 'given way' to other virtues, such as being sensitive to their children's feelings. And if this is the case, then they are expressing 'ideal virtue' or something close to it. Alternatively, if their less-than-perfect expressions of virtues cause avoidable harm to their children, then they are not in fact a good parent.

Or, consider that Emma believes that lying to get ahead makes her a better politician. If by 'better' we mean more successful in terms of attracting voters or acquiring funding from special interests, then lying might be quite effective. But what is the function of a politician? Is it not to contribute to the sustainable wellbeing of the public and accurately represent one's constituents' needs? If so, then lying does not make her a better politician.

Cokelet further points out that philosophers such as Wang Yangming believe 'that human beings have an innate ability to know right from wrong and that the task of virtue cultivation should focus on eliminating things like selfish desires or self-centered psychological tendencies.' On this view, Yangming would 'presumably reject [the] assumption that practical wisdom ... is needed, or would be useful, for virtue development.' We do not know whether people have an innate ability to know right from wrong, but whether we believe virtue to be cultivated by clearing away selfish desires or building goodness into the system, how do we escape the need to occasionally reflect on our goals and why they matter? Why should we work hard to quiet selfish desires? We do not see how this question is any less important (and important to reflect upon) than the question of why we should actively cultivate virtuous capacities.

Cokelet's final suggestion was to refine our account into a 'productively neutral' theory by removing these contentious claims and converting them into empirical hypotheses. We argue against removing content from our theory. So long as our theoretical claims are not unreasonable to many philosophers and psychologists, we wish to stick by them. We have provided reasons for retaining deliberation and reflection in our account of practical wisdom. Supposing the reasons we have provided are compelling, we ask: Why should we pare our theory back to accommodate anti-rationalists when we think they are on the wrong track with respect to virtue and flourishing? What would a neutral theory look like (if it is even possible), given the deep differences in theoretical commitments between rationalists (like neo-Aristotelians and Kantians) and anti-rationalists?

Cokelet's critique fails to acknowledge that we had two related, but nonetheless separate, goals. As described in the Introduction (p. 3) of our book, we set out to accomplish two things:

• Present a theory of virtue and character that was both philosophically rigorous and empirically plausible. While keeping it as 'ecumenical' as possible, we did not aim to strip it down to only its 'neutral' (i.e., non-controversial) parts. So, the only question of relevance is whether we succeeded in presenting a theory that both philosophers and empirical researchers can get behind (taking for granted that not everyone will).
• Use that theory as a 'case study' to illustrate what a robust research program should look like. We openly invite our readers to take our ideas and apply them to their preferred theory of virtue. There is no reason to presume that researchers are beholden to our theory, and their disagreement with it in no way diminishes the value of the research structure we articulated.

Empirical research can and should play a role in testing and refining aspects of our theory. And we provided an ecumenical theory because it was better aligned with the available scientific data. For example, we abandoned Aristotle's version of the unity of virtues thesis, instead developing the integration thesis, which poses a developmental contextual account to explain how we think virtues can 'hang together' in a unified character.

We agree with Cokelet that empirical hypotheses should be generated from our theory. Future empirical studies should, for example, test the validity of the measures suggested in our book, including approaches that attempt to tease out non-conscious forms of deliberation, as well as compare the relative strength of phronetic reflection vs. other learning processes in virtue cultivation.

However, we do not agree that the theory should be 'neutral.' Much of what generates interesting and testable hypotheses are non-neutral claims.

We appreciate Cokelet's thoughtful extended review of our book, and the opportunity to reply to the important concerns he raises. Although we push back against his recommendations, we generally agree with much in his review—that virtue research should guard against strictly conscious rationalist assumptions of practical wisdom, that phronetic reflection does not guarantee (nor is it the only means of) virtue development, and that empirical research is key to moving the field of virtue scholarship forward.

We have clarified that our account of virtue encompasses not only conscious but also non-conscious forms of complex deliberation that occur relatively automatically; that even flawed phronetic reflection likely conspires toward virtue cultivation and itself likely improves with practice and support from social partners; and that part of the value of our theory is the generation of falsifiable, testable hypotheses that can feed back into refining and improving the theory. We hope our theory will stimulate such research and we look forward to adapting it in response to evidence.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).