مصر خريطه سى [Map of Egypt]

اركان خربيه عموميه مطبعه سى [Erkan-i Harbiye-i Umumiye Matbaası / General War Printing Office] 1330 [1914].

"A very rare official Ottoman map of Lower Egypt, including Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal, made on the eve of World War I, when the area was a key invasion target for Ottoman-German forces that resulted in two shocking (yet ultimately unsuccessful) attacks upon the Suez Canal, the lifeline of the British Empire – the highly detailed folding map was seemingly made to be carried by Ottoman officers for use in strategic planning in the field. This attractive and very rare official Ottoman map depicts Lower Egypt, including Cairo, the Nile Delta, Alexandria and the Suez Canal, the vital transport nexus that connected the East and West (completed in 1869). Colour lithographed in four hues (black, green, blue and orange), the map captures this ultra-strategic region that since 1882 was under British colonial domination, at critical juncture, right on the eve of World War I. During the conflict, a combined Ottoman-German force attempted to seize the Suez Canal, with the eventual objective of rushing into Cairo (supposedly backed by Egyptians who were disaffected by the British-backed regime). If that were to occur, the British would suffer a devastating blow, losing their base in the Middle East and severing their best connection to India, Malaya and Australia. So concerned were the British over the Ottoman-German threat that they deposed the puppet ruler of Egypt, the Khedive Abbas II, who they (rightly) suspected of being an Ottoman agent; the British duly replaced his with his more cooperative uncle. The map is very detailed, labeling all cities and towns, topographical features, railways and main roads. The map incudes several insets, detailing Cairo (lower left corner); Port Suez and Port Said, the critical ports that marked both ends of the Suez Canal (upper right); Alexandria (lower right corner); and regional view that embraces all of Egypt and extends up the Nile to take in Sudan and Ethiopia (lower left). The map was seemingly made to be used by Ottoman officers as a strategic planning aid; folding, and of a manageable size, it could be carried in the field. The Ottoman-German Bid to Take the Suez Canal and to Storm Egypt During World War I, the Suez Canal was the most important single lifeline of the British Empire, the funnel through which hundreds of thousands of troops and vast amounts of critical commodities flowed in from India, Australia, New Zealand and Malaya. The 100-mile-long channel was also considered by the German-Ottoman side to be the ‘weakest link’ in Britain’s global transport network. The Suez Canal was bordered on the east by the vast deserts of the Sinai Peninsula, on the other side of which was Ottoman Palestine. On one hand the Sinai provided a level of protection for the Suez, as with no roads, few waterholes and scorching temperatures that could reach 50 Celsius, it was notoriously difficult to cross. On the other hand, the place was so desolate that it would be difficult to detect any force that somehow managed to traverse the peninsula, leaving the Suez vulnerable to stealth attack. Moreover, a clear breach of the canal by a large enemy force would leave Cairo in grave danger. The Ottoman-German desire to strike the Suez was hardly a secret. Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman Navy Minister, and one of the ‘Young Turk’ triumvirate that ruled the Sublime Porte, set off from Istanbul on November 21, 1914, to lead the Ottoman Army in Syria, publicly declaring to a large crowd that he would not return until he has conquered Egypt. Meanwhile, the British command in Cairo was highly confident that the vast expanse of the Sinai could not be crossed by a force strong enough to overcome their entrenched defensive system along the canal, manned by the 50,000 troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. They attributed Djemal’s declaration to be one of the Young Turks’ many grandiose, yet empty PR exercises. However, these assumptions bred a dangerous sense of complacency. As it turned out the Ottoman-German side was deadly serious about striking the Suez. While Djemal remained the figurehead, the field commander of the project was the German Colonel (later General) Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, a brilliant logistical planner, albeit not the best tactician. In early January, in Beersheba, in Southern Palestine, the Ottoman-German side assembled the Ottoman Expeditionary Force, a mixed army of Turkish regulars, a wide assortment of Arab volunteers, plus a small number of German officers, their total numbers rivalling those of the British forces in Egypt. Kressenstein gradually moved his force into the Sinai, all the while building rough roads, and setting up re-victualling stations at regular intervals to maintain a healthy army and a tight supply chain; he even extended the Palestine Railway a bit to ease the route. Kressenstein’s plan was to methodically cross the Sinai to make a stealth strike upon the canal, hopefully breaching the British defences, and leading the enemy into disarray. It was also hoped (and confidently assumed by Djemal, amongst others) that upon seeing the weakness of the British forces, the Egyptian masses would rebel against their ‘infidel occupiers’ in favour an invading force dominated by fellow Muslims. In the best-case scenario, the British side would fold, leaving the Ottoman-German force to simply march into Cairo, cheered by the people. The Ottoman Expeditionary Force was aided by the fact that the British command decided upon a defensive strategy, to simply bunker down along the canal. They elected not to send any reconnaissance parties into the Sinai lest they be cut down by the enemy. While the British and French sent planes to fly over the desert, their coverage only extended a short distance. In January 1915, the Ottoman-German forces crossed the Sinai in about two weeks, perfectly following Kressenstein’s masterly plan, their final approach to the canal concealed by a sandstorm. While the British gained some last-minute intelligence that the enemy was approaching, the had no idea as to where along the canal they would strike, or in what kind of numbers. Fearing being trapped between the enemy and the water; the British withdrew all their forces to the western (far side) of the canal. On the night of February 2-4, 1915, the Ottoman-German forces struck the Suez Canal near Ismailia, mounting smaller diversionary strikes at other areas. The British were caught off-guard and initially struggled to marshal their forces. However, Kressenstein’s plan called for the rapid and smooth crossing of the canal and the opening of a breach in the British lines on the opposite side. As it turned out, the crossing of the canal was conducted in clumsily, slow manner, giving the British time to arrive on scene in great force. The British managed to blow up the pontoon bridge the attackers had constructed before significant numbers of Ottoman troops were able to cross the canal; those that did were promptly cut down or captured. The British then directed hellfire on the Ottoman-German side, rendering their crossing impossible. Realizing that their objective was lost, they Ottoman-German forces mounted a hasty and disorderly retreat eastward into the Sinai. While the British crossed the canal and mopped up stragglers, they decided not to pursue the enemy into the desert. This decision was subsequently criticized, as many thought it possible that the British could have annihilated the Ottoman Expeditionary Force if they gave chase. However, desert warfare is inherently unpredictable (especially, as the true size of the Ottoman-German force was unknown the British), and it was reasoned by the local British command that it was best to guarantee the safety of the canal, and not risk an excursion into the Sinai. The Ottoman-German force managed to safely return to their bases in Palestine and the far eastern Sinai, having preserved most of its men and equipment; they lived to fight another day. For the next 18 months both sides generally assumed defensive positions. The nightmarish the Gallipoli Campaign (February 1915 – January 1916) distracted the high commands of both sides, as well as severely depleting their local troop strength (as many divisions were sent to fight in Turkey). Additionally, the Ottomans were concerned about the loyalty of many of the Arab subjects. These fears would prove to be well-founded upon the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in June 1916, when the Hashemites of Hejaz joined the British side, with the help of ‘Lawrence of Arabia’. During the early part of 1916, once the Gallipoli Campaign was over, the Ottoman-German forces created a massive forward base at El Arish, in the north-eastern Sinai. There they received significant troop reinforcements and shipments of the most advanced equipment from Germany including airplanes and mobile heavy artillery. Meanwhile, the British established a forward base at the Qatiya Oasis, about 35 miles east of the Suez, toward the Mediterranean shore. This ultra-modern encampment was eventually served by a railway, as well freshwater pipelines running from the Suez. This position was manned by approximately 15,000 troops, primarily of the ANZAC Mounted Division (including Lt. Col. Walshe) and the British 52nd (Lowland) Division. The force was commanded by Lieutenant General Archibald Murray, assisted General Herbert Lawrence and the Australian General Harry Chauvel. On April 23, 1916, Kressenstein mounted a daring raid upon the periphery of the Qatiya area. Amazingly, he surprised and easily captured an entire British cavalry unit of almost 600 men. This emboldened the Ottoman-German side towards mounting a grand operation. Despite this event, in the weeks that followed, the British command at Qatiya naively assumed that Kressenstein would not dare mount a full-scale attack upon their forward base during the summer, when temperatures regularly exceeded 40 degrees Celsius. The British moved the location of their main camp, to the tiny village of Romani, amidst some great sand hills above the Qatiya Oasis. During the last part of July, British advance parties reported enemy activity in the desert moving towards the Qaitiya area; however, this was mistaken for Ottoman-German reconnaissance parties. However, during the night of August 3-4, 1916, Kressenstein managed with stealth to move his main force of 16,000 men, armed with heavy artillery within striking distance of the Romani camp. Walshe and his fellow officers were woken in the middle of the night facing a crisis. As the sun came up on August 4, the Ottoman-German force had moved in towards the British potions but met with fierce resistance. The attackers eventually managed to take many of the highlands around Romani, including Wellington Ridge, seemingly a bad sign for the British. However, Kressenstein’s fierce artillery barrages fell off their mark, allowing the defenders to regroup. The British fought valiantly, while the Ottoman-German forces, suffering from heat exhaustion and lack of ammunition, started to flag. On August 5, the British side forced the attackers off the highlands into unfavourable terrain, within the range of their heavy guns. This forced the Ottoman-German army to move further back to Qatiya, an untenable lowland position. Kressenstein then ordered a full retreat towards El Arish. The German commander, always good at logistics, managed to quickly move out his heavy artillery and valuable equipment, ensuring that they were safe for use another day. Some of the Ottoman-German detachments likewise beat a clean retreat, while others straggled, making them vulnerable to attack or capture. The British pursued the retreating Ottoman-German army; however, they were slow out of the gate. While they did manage to take 4,000 prisoners, they failed to entrap the main body of Kressenstein’s force. The British chased the Ottomans for some days until reaching Bir el Abd, where meeting a fierce rear-guard action, convincing the British to call off the pursuit. Kressenstein managed to return to El Arish with the core of his army intact and almost all his prized equipment. While the British Imperial forces had fought brilliantly against the attack upon Romani, Whitehall was bitterly critical of Murray, Lawrence and Chauvel’s failure to hunt down and annihilate Kressenstein’s retreating army. While it is possible that this could have been achieved, in retrospect the criticism seems a bit too harsh, as mounting such a chase in the desert in summer is certainly easier said than done. While it true was that Kressenstein’s force lived to fight another day, so did the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Moreover, the Suez Canal, the great lifeline of the British Empire, was henceforth resolutely safe from attack. The Battle of Romani marked a major turning point in that prior to the event, the Ottoman-German side had always been on the offensive; from the point onwards, they were always on the defensive. For the next five months the British cautiously pushed eastwards, evicting the Ottoman-German forces from El Arish and the Sinai altogether by early January 1917. The British forces in Egypt where then given the green light to invade Ottoman Palestine. However, this proved to be an exceedingly difficult task, as the Ottoman-German side mounted fierce resistance. The British were for a time stopped cold by Kressentein at the Second Battle of Gaza (April 17-18, 1917). However, they eventually regrouped and moved forward, although it was not until December 11, 1917, that they took Jerusalem. The British capture of Damascus on October 1, 1918, is generally viewed as the end of major hostilities in the Levant, coming less than a month before the Ottoman Empire’s general surrender at the Armistice of Mudros (October 29, 1918)." (Alexander Johnson and Dasa Pahor, 2022)