WAR POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A SYMPOSIUM ON STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN'S LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION AND MARIAH ZEISBERG'S WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: WAR POWERS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND NATIONAL SECURITY STATE CAPACITY

Introduction As a student of the comparative politics of national security institutions, military capabilities, and defense spending, I have been inspired by the authors' empirical research and nuanced development of the war powers debate to elaborate upon the state-society - or public-private - relationships in U.S. national security policy since 1945. The post-World War II ("WWII") phenomenon of private contractors involved in national security has been labeled as the "Fourth Branch" of government, a term once used to refer to independent government agencies. 3 However, Mariah Zeisberg's analysis of the legislative investigations into the role of the munitions industry in the United States's entry into World War I ("WWI") reveals a history of private actors in war, with allegations of influence that sound familiar to contemporary debates. (Zeisberg p. 188-93). Both Zeisberg's discussion of the munitions committee and Stephen Griffin's discussion of the role of civilian expertise inspired my reflection on the structural and systematic influence of this "Fourth Branch" of private activity within the context of the war powers debate. Instead of looking at the balance of power between branches of government over war, I discuss the balances of power between state and society over war. What is the impact - if any - of private actors on war powers in the United States? Influence may be twofold, affecting each of the legislative and executive branches of government. First, the increasing outsourcing of national security policymaking and expertise (and delegation to private military companies) enhances presidential autonomy over ...