A Critique of Antinomies as Justification for the Usual Interpretation of Kant’s Epistemology ; Kritika antinomija kao opravdanja uobičajene interpretacije Kantove epistemologije

The transcendental ideality of the objects of cognition is an essential part of Kant’s epistemology — at least, in its usual interpretation. In this article, the author proposes that (precisely because of the transcendental ideality thesis), the usual interpretation of Kant’s epistemology (UIKE) suffers from problems of incoherence, and plausibly so, and so is not clearly justified. In response to the suggestion that antinomies justify UIKE, the author claims that at least one antinomy should then be rationally compulsive, however, not one of them is. The author, therefore, concludes that antinomies do not justify UIKE and, that if antinomies are the only justification for UIKE, then it is not justified. ; Transcendentalna idealnost predmeta naše spoznaje bitna je sastavnica Kantove epistemologije — barem njezine uobičajene interpretacije. U članku se tvrdi da (upravo zbog teze o transcendentalnoj idealnosti) uobičajena interpretacija Kantove epistemologije (UIKE) plauzibilno pati od problema nekoherencije i nije jasno opravdana. Na tvrdnju da antinomije daju opravdanje za UIKE u članku se odgovara da bi onda barem jedna antinomija morala biti racionalno–kompulzivna. Međutim nijedna nije. Stoga se zaključuje kako UIKE nije opravdana antinomijama i — ako su antinomije jedino opravdanje za UIKE — onda ona nije opravdana.