Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection
In: https://essec.hal.science/hal-01285185 ; 2016, 2016
Online
report
Zugriff:
I analyse a market with adverse selection in which companies competè a la Bertrand by offering menus of contracts. Contrary to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), I allow for any finite number of types and states and more general utility functions. I define the generalised Rothschild-Stiglitz Profile of Actions (RSPA), and I show that, in every possible market, if the RSPA is efficient, it is also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium profile of actions. On the contrary, I show that in markets in which the RSPA is not efficient, preferences admit an expected utility representation with strictly increasing and strictly concave VNM utilities and a weak sorting condition holds, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
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Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Dosis, Anastasios ; ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) ; ESSEC Business School-Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA) ; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-CY Cergy Paris Université (CY)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-CY Cergy Paris Université (CY) |
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Zeitschrift: | https://essec.hal.science/hal-01285185 ; 2016, 2016 |
Veröffentlichung: | HAL CCSD, 2016 |
Medientyp: | report |
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