Cavalry at the wet gap: the 2nd and 3rd Mechanized Cavalry groups during the Moselle River crossing, 1944.

Contested wet gap crossings in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) are inherently dangerous, and units conducting these operations assume extremely high levels of risk. However, history shows that the proper utilization of cavalry forces during gap crossings greatly reduces both risk to force and mission. This thesis examines how the 2nd and 3rd Mechanized Cavalry Groups (MCG) enabled XII and XX Corps of Third Army to cross the Moselle River in France from August to November 1944. Modeled after United States Army gap crossing phases, the chapters trace the advance from Normandy to the Moselle, the assault across the Moselle, and the attack from the Moselle towards the cities of Metz and Nancy. Throughout the entire gap crossing process the MCGs enabled through reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations, ultimately allowing exploitable advantages for XII and XX Corps. They also demonstrated the necessity of disciplined initiative, fighting well, and proper task organization in cavalry formations during LSCO. Lessons drawn from this examination include potential models for the task organization and employment of corps and division level cavalry during a wet gap crossing and potential implications for the training of cavalry forces.