Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations during Eelam War IV: Comparative Analysis of Galula and Rajapaksa Models to Determine Future Applicability

A cursory analysis of the global environment strongly indicates that nations will continue to face the threats of terrorism, insurgency, and separatism. The unpredictable and asymmetric nature of such conflicts has posed serious challenges for nations encountering them. This monograph begins with a brief literature review of the counterinsurgency (COIN) theories of Great Britain, France, and Sri Lanka. The monograph then examines two historical case studies of counterinsurgency to understand the key elements of a successful COIN strategy, and how it can be applied in a future conflict. The first case study analyzes the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, which resulted in a military success but a political defeat for France. The research focuses on lessons learned by authors David Galula and Roger Trinquier based on their experiences during the conflict. The case study highlights the conceptual, planning, and execution phases of the COIN operation and how the objectives and desired end-state were achieved. The second case study focuses on counterinsurgency operations applied by the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka under the leadership of President Rajapaksa against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the Eelam War IV from 2005 to 2009. The case study analyzes the eight principles of the Rajapaksa COIN Model, and why it achieved unprecedented success in comparison to previous efforts by the Sri Lankan Government. The monograph then presents a comparative analysis of the Rajapaksa COIN model and David Galula's COIN model to ascertain similarities and differences from conception to completion of operations. Comparison of the Rajapaksa Model with an already established COIN theory assists in determining the efficacy of the concept and its utility in a future COIN conflict. ; The original document contains color images.