Lessons learned and forgotten: electronic warfare in the United States Army.

Since World War Two, the US Army has tended to neglect its electronic warfare (EW) enterprise until the start of a conflict. Once in conflict, the US Army has rapidly developed equipment, organizations, and doctrine to meet the operational environment's demands. The speed and lethality of future combat against near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China may demand a US Army EW enterprise that is already manned, trained, and equipped at the start of the conflict. The gap in EW capabilities that have characterized the US Army in previous conflicts may lead to defeat during future conflicts if large-scale combat operations (LSCO) begin quickly. This monograph focuses on the lessons that the US Army has learned and forgotten while employing EW during and following: World War Two, Vietnam, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Closely examining EW during these three conflicts and the lessons learned may inform current EW equipment, organizations, and doctrine in the US Army.