Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks.

This article studies the relationship between elections and domestic terrorism in democracies. Do approaching elections lead to an increase in the volume of terrorist activity? Extant theory suggests that terrorist groups strategically plan their attacks around elections. I argue that approaching elections are not always affiliated with an increase in the volume of terrorist activity. Electoral permissiveness, an important feature of democratic electoral systems, influences the extent to which periods close to elections are periods of heightened terrorist activity. Approaching elections lead to an increase in the volume of attacks in democracies with low electoral permissiveness but not in others. I test my argument with data from Western European democracies between 1950 and 2004. Using statistical models that include country fixed effects, I show that approaching elections are affiliated with an increase of the volume of attacks in democracies with the least permissive electoral systems, but not in democracies with permissive electoral systems. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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