Conditional restraint: Why the India-Pakistan Kargil War is not a case of nuclear deterrence.
In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jg. 79 (2023-11-01), Heft 6, S. 388-392
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Zugriff:
In the 1999 Kargil War, India defended its territory from a Pakistani incursion but--in a departure from its historical behavior and standing war plans--chose not to expand the war with counter-attacks into Pakistan. Many observers attribute this restraint to nuclear deterrence, since India and Pakistan had become declared nuclear powers just a year earlier. In fact, India's restraint was rooted not in deterrence, but specific strategic conditions. Those conditions no longer apply--and in a future conflict India may be encouraged to take especially risky and escalatory wartime action, which would pose an unprecedented test for nuclear deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Titel: |
Conditional restraint: Why the India-Pakistan Kargil War is not a case of nuclear deterrence.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Tarapore, Arzan |
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Zeitschrift: | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jg. 79 (2023-11-01), Heft 6, S. 388-392 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2023 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0096-3402 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1080/00963402.2023.2266943 |
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