Governing the grapevine: the study of rumor during World War II.

By: Cathy Faye
York University;

Acknowledgement: Cathy Faye is a doctoral student in the History and Theory of Psychology Program at York University. Her research interests include the history of social psychology, the development of social psychology during the Second World War, and historical relationships and boundaries between psychology, social psychology, and sociology.
I would like to sincerely thank the archival staff of the American Folklife Center at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC, for all of their kind cooperation and assistance. I would also like to thank Christopher D. Green for his helpful commentary and guidance in the preparation of this article.

Describing the vast disciplinary changes that occurred in the field of social psychology during the Second World War, Dorwin Cartwright (1948) wrote,

Hardly had the smoke cleared from Pearl Harbor before the government began drawing special psychologists into its war-time activities. By March, 1942, the evacuation of the campuses was well under way; many psychologists were already living in Washington, immersed in the tasks of organizing research staffs and learning their way about government agencies. (pp. 337–338)

Three decades later, Cartwright (1979), again described the war as an event that “fundamentally altered social psychologists’ view of the field and its place in society, and established social psychology, once and for all, as a legitimate field of specialization worthy of public support” (p. 84). Many authors have indeed concurred with Cartwright’s assessment. Sewell (1989) depicted the war years as characterized by “enthusiasm, activity, and support” (p. 5), and described the war as the springboard for the Golden Age of social psychology. Herman (1995) also pointed to the opportunities provided to psychologists during World War II: “No event illustrates better how military conflict offered psychologists unprecedented opportunities to demonstrate the practical worth of their social theories, human sciences, and behavioral technologies in making and shaping public policy” (p. 5). Speaking specifically on the relationship between psychologists and the government, Herman argued that the war provided social scientists with the opportunity “to outgrow their roles as private citizens and carve out niches for themselves in government” (p. 6). This point was also made by Capshew (1999), who stated that the war provided “governmental sanction” for psychological work.

Indeed, there is little doubt that collaboration between the government and social scientists greatly increased during the war years. Furthermore, the war clearly provided social scientists with vast research opportunities and extensive resources and therefore contributed directly to the growth of these disciplines. As Tryon (1963) demonstrates, social psychology, one of the more active subdisciplines during the war years, was nearly nonexistent prior to World War II. During the war, however, social psychologists, claiming their expertise in areas such as leadership, conformity, public opinion, and morale building, were in high demand. By 1942, a large number of psychologists were employed by Washington and many had set up temporary residence in the capital city (Cartwright, 1948; Marquis, 1944).

While much historical research has documented this overwhelming activity and growth in the social sciences during the war years, little has been written regarding the difficulties encountered on the part of both the government and social scientists during this period of trial-and-error collaboration. The 1940s were, in fact, often trying times for the government and for social scientists. Differences in the approaches and aims of the two groups, combined with the rather haphazard and hurried nature of the partnership, often led to misunderstandings and boundary disputes. Lack of government backing and funding for wartime projects was common, given the proliferation of project proposals, leading to dissatisfaction and cynicism among researchers (Newcomb, 1942). Throughout the early years, social scientists also became increasingly dissatisfied with the time required to work with Washington agencies and the vast amount of planning and compromise that went into such a partnership; some began promoting a more decentralized effort that did not require government collaboration (Newcomb, 1942; Parkovnick, 1998). As Napoli (1981) explains: “Operating in a large authoritarian bureaucracy annoyed some psychologists. They doubted that their superiors possessed enough knowledge about psychology to make informed decisions on psychological activity” (p. 103). Similarly, members of government agencies doubted the knowledge and capabilities of social scientists in a matter as dire as international conflict. Indeed, a small but growing body of literature suggests that tension and conflict between the two groups was a common element of wartime attempts at collaboration (Nicholson, 1997; Parkovnick, 1998).

The present paper adds to this literature by outlining one particular example of strained collaboration within wartime social science: the case of rumor research during World War II. The study of rumor during World War II provides a striking illustration of the tensions and difficulties encountered by social scientists and the United States government during the 1940s. Differences of opinion regarding the role of social scientists in the study and control of rumor complicated relations between the two parties. While social scientists believed that their skills and knowledge prepared them for substantial involvement not only in basic research, but also in application and public education, the government often diminished their duties to simple data collection. What began as a promising collaboration therefore slowly became a struggle over professional boundaries and expertise.

Rumor on the Home Front: The OFF and Rumor Control

Throughout the latter half of 1941, the United States (U.S.) government began preparing American citizens for entry into World War II. Faced with a somewhat divided populace, including strong isolationist and interventionist sectors, the government began monitoring citizens’ attitudes toward U.S. involvement and began devising campaigns to bolster support for U.S. entry into the war. On December 7, 1941, however, the possibility of U.S. involvement quickly became a grim reality. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the task at hand was no longer one of gaining support for the war; rather, the government was now faced with the task of maintaining that support (Casey, 2001; O’Neill, 1993).

Public mistrust proved to be one of the greatest impediments to civilian support and compliance during the months leading up to and following Pearl Harbor. As security standards regarding the release of information became more stringent, the public became more wary of the information that they did receive. As early as October of 1941, one popular columnist described civilian attitudes as “clouded, divided, doubtful, hesitant, and therefore apprehensive” and attributed this state of affairs to “the Administration’s mishandling of public information … the public has not been told enough” (DeVoto, 1941, p. 671).

The delay of information pertaining to the events at Pearl Harbor served to further complicate matters. While the public anxiously awaited details regarding the events leading up to the attack and the resulting number of losses, the government remained silent, refusing to comment on stories that were circulating (Hurd, 1941). As one journalist wrote, “the silence created a growing possibility that the public would soon begin to believe all rumors, simply because no facts were made available to controvert them” (“Drastic control,” 1941, p. 7). While the government did eventually release an official statement in mid-December, the damage to public confidence in wartime news seemed irreparable (“Fight on rumors,” 1941; “Warns against rumors,” 1941). Despite the government’s many attempts to manage public information and opinion, rumors continued to run rife. Simply informing the public to avoid “loose talk” had little effect; a more strategic approach to understanding and reducing rumor was deemed necessary. It was within this context that the idea of “rumor clinics” developed.

“A Project for the Analysis of Rumors”

While the first existing rumor clinics would later come into operation without government guidance, the idea for the clinics was set in motion within the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF). The proposal for the implementation of the clinics was part of a larger plan deemed the “Rumor Project,” which was proposed to the OFF in January of 1942. The proposal came to the main branch of the OFF from two of its subcommittees: the Office of Education and the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI). This first proposal emphasized the harmful effects of Axis-inspired rumors and stressed the need to educate the American public, such that they could take “a positive role in the identification and analysis of rumors” (Williams & Potter, 1942). In this proposal, it was suggested that the government begin by investigating and classifying approximately 30 prevalent rumors that arose from 1939 to 1941, creating a case study of sorts for each of these rumors. Three agencies were to be involved in the project: the Research and Analysis Branch of the OCI, the Bureau of Intelligence of the OFF, and the Civilian Morale Service of the Office of Education. The first of the agencies would take note of reference to the selected rumors in foreign media, while the second would examine the same material in U.S. media.

The final aspect of the proposal, the rumor clinics, was to be the domain of the Office of Education. In order to obtain a large and varied number of rumors in circulation, the Office of Education would collect data on current rumors by means of “Rumor Clinics organized in colleges and universities in all regions of the United States” (Williams & Potter, 1942). The information received by the clinics was to be passed on to the OFF and the OCI by the Office of Education. Upon completion of the project and analysis of the findings, the Office of Education was to make the findings available for use in the rumor clinics. The first definition of the term rumor clinic is found in the closing section of this memorandum:

A rumor clinic is a specialized group of volunteer professors and advanced students, prepared by a short intensive course on psychological warfare under the supervision of the Civilian Morale Service to collect, analyze, and route to the Office of Education significant rumors current in the clinic’s area.

The clinics, however, were to serve not only as research agencies, but also as counseling agencies, intended to provide an “understanding of the problem of rumor-mongering” and to serve as “an outlet for authentic information.” The memorandum indicated that eight potential clinics had already been identified and were “ready for the kind of cooperative assistance outlined here” (Williams & Potter, 1942). Plans for approximately 20 more clinics were already underway. This early proposal was quite optimistic about the plans for studying rumor, with the exception of a single statement regarding the potential dangers involved; the document contains a cautionary note that rumor analysis may serve to propagate rather than prevent the spread of rumors.

This initial proposal was sent to Cornelius DuBois, the Executive Assistant of the Bureau of Intelligence. DuBois sent it on to R. Keith Kane, the Assistant Director, stating that, while he was not “100% sure of the wisdom of the proposed set up,” he believed they would gain a wealth of information from it, particularly via the rumor clinics, which he viewed as a potential source of “quick information on certain word-of-mouth stories” (Dubois, 1942a) The proposal was then sent off by Archibald MacLeish (then the Director of the OFF) to J. W. Studebaker, the Commissioner of Education, who expressed satisfaction with the proposed set up and offered his full support through the Office of Education. Studebaker agreed to coordinate the efforts of the government and university professors. By the end of January, the project had received approval by almost all of the agencies involved and the OCI had begun studying the circulation of rumors in Europe. At this stage, MacLeish did express some concern about the possibility of local clinics counteracting rumors in their communities, stating that such action would require specific clearance and caution.

MacLeish’s slight misgivings were taken quite seriously. DuBois quickly wrote to representatives at the OCI, asserting that they would not give the Rumor Clinic Project full approval until they fully understood the role of social scientists in the larger operation. Specifically, he questioned whether the rumor material “is to be sent back to the clinics for local dissemination” and indicated that most of the officials at the OFF felt that decisions regarding the release of such materials should be left entirely in the hands of the OFF (DuBois, 1942b). OCI representatives responded quickly, quelling the fears of DuBois, Kane, and MacLeish, by reassuring them that they would agree to grant the OFF full authority over release of the materials (Potter, 1942; Studebaker, 1942b; Williams, 1942).

With the Rumor Clinic Project now having received full approval, the OCI drafted a letter to college presidents outlining the Project and asking if they wished to participate (Williams, n.d.). Enclosed in the letter was an outline of how to organize and operate a clinic. The clinics were to be headed by a professor of psychology or sociology, chosen by the president, and that individual was to then recruit approximately 30 other professors and advanced students to participate. Every member of the clinic was to volunteer at least two hours per week in the clinic and had to be an individual who had “demonstrated loyalty to American institutions.” All members were to take part in a two-week intensive course on psychological warfare, in accordance with a “Rumor Clinic Syllabus” to be provided by the OFF. An examination would follow the course and passing volunteers would become members. The president of the university or college would then inform the Office of Education of the existence of the clinic and the Office would designate the group as an official rumor clinic. At each meeting of the clinic, members would examine all incoming rumors and classify them into those to be reported to Washington and those that could be handled locally by the clinic. It seemed the Rumor Clinic Project would run smoothly and be implemented by April of 1942.

Toward the end of February, however, concerns again began to arise regarding the precise role of the clinics in the dissemination of information to the public. This apprehension concerning the Project is evident in a letter from Robert Huse of the Social Security Board to MacLeish where Huse (1942) reports on a conversation he had had with Chester Williams, an OCI representative. In the letter, he expressed fear regarding the involvement of social scientists in a matter of such importance. Reporting on his conversation with Williams, Huse (1942) warned MacLeish of the potential dangers of the project:

[U]pon cross-questioning, he admitted … that most of the work which these professors are to do will be ’on their own,’ in other words not in conformity with policy statements received from the Government … The point is that whereas the scheme on its face looks as though it is under control, Williams actually indicates that most of what the volunteer rumor analysts will do will be entirely without control or direction.

He closed the letter by strongly advising MacLeish to reconsider the Project.

MacLeish promptly took the matter up with Studebaker, expressing his concern about “public discussion without centralized control” and noting the possibility that such discussion may serve to perpetuate rather than prevent the spread of rumors (MacLeish, 1942). Studebaker responded almost a month later, calmly asserting that there had to have been some misunderstanding regarding the Project, as no proposals were made to have clinics do local analysis and dissemination. He suggested that, “the matter be held in abeyance as it does not appear that the three offices are prepared to provide the necessary leadership … needed to assure the success of the project” (Studebaker, 1942c). He cautioned, however, that local groups would undoubtedly begin doing rumor analysis with or without government support.

While the OFF awaited Studebaker’s response, the Office of Education went ahead with the Rumor Clinics Project, contacting Robert Knapp, an assistant and student of Gordon Allport at Harvard University. Toward the end of February, Knapp was already in the process of setting up a clinic (Knapp, 1942a), but was then told that organizational difficulties would temporarily hold up the project (Nelson, 1942b). A new draft of the letter to college presidents also appeared at the end of February and the attached memorandum differed significantly from the previous one. The new “Prospectus on Rumor Clinics” omitted all mention of work to be done independently by psychologists or sociologists and limited the actions of social scientists to data collection (Nelson, 1942a).

Throughout the month of March, the OFF became more and more suspicious of the Project, as is evidenced in a letter from DuBois to Kane, where he stated that he was “horrified … at the turn the project has taken” (DuBois, 1942c). The OFF, however, was in somewhat of a precarious position; the most desirable route would be to completely withdraw from the project, yet such withdrawal would mean completely relinquishing government control of the project. By this time, groups in Boston and North Carolina had already begun operating clinics independently and others were in the early stages of formation. Thus, even if the OFF attempted to put a stop to the Office of Education clinics, something would have to be done about the independent projects launched by social scientists. In his letter to Kane, DuBois wrote:

It would be disastrous in any event to have a lot of psychologists spotted around the country doing their own rumor analyses and discussing them publicly. The original point of the rumor clinic project was to provide control and prevent amateur and uninformed public discussion of rumors. Mr. Chester Williams broke bounds on this phase of the job, and that very probably subjects the whole idea to scrutiny. But let’s have it carefully scrutinized before it is killed.

After a final meeting between the Bureau of Intelligence and the OCI, it was decided that “the rumor clinic project is at a stalemate and will have to be considered dead or at least on ice” (DuBois, 1942d). Indeed, by the end of March, the Office of War Information (OWI) began outlining a new approach for the study of rumor, one that did not in any way involve the cooperation of rumor clinics. In this new proposal for rumor analysis, the clinics were completely rejected “because their uncontrolled activities would certainly produce unfavorable local and possibly national publicity” (Katz, 1942a). The new project was to be conducted solely under the guidance of government agencies.

The Psychological Study of Rumor: The Boston Rumor Clinic

The OFF’s withdrawal from the Rumor Clinic Project, however, did not signal the end of this venture. Rather, with the government now having firmly removed itself from the project, social scientists, journalists, and politicians were free to proceed with the project on their own terms. Throughout the remainder of 1942, rumor clinics began to proliferate in the United States and Canada at a rate that the OFF had not anticipated. By February of 1942, Gordon Allport of Harvard University and his student assistant, Robert Knapp, were in the process of instituting what would become the first and most successful rumor clinic to operate during the war years.

Throughout the war years, Gordon Allport took a very active leadership role in wartime psychological research, often acting as an intermediary between psychologists and the government. While many social scientists left the universities and colleges and found positions within government agencies, Allport chose to remain on the Harvard campus and devoted the bulk of his energy to coordinating the study of civilian morale during wartime. He, along with many colleagues, helped to institute a series of Defense Seminars in colleges and universities, sought funding from the government and educational research agencies, and attempted to establish a clearing house for psychological research (Allport & Veltfort, 1943; Capshew, 1999; Parkovnick, 1998). The Boston Herald Rumor Clinic, managed in large part by his graduate student, Robert H. Knapp, was a part of this larger initiative. Despite Allport’s many commitments during the early part of 1941 and despite a lack of government support, the Boston Clinic ran its first advertisement in March of 1942.

The set-up of the Boston Clinic became the prototype for the many clinics that would follow in the months to come. The focal point of the Clinic was a column published every Sunday in the newspaper. Prevalent rumors were chosen for analysis and refutation. These rumors would be labeled as such and printed in italics, followed by an answer or refutation labeled “Fact” and printed in bold type. Frequently, the column would include a psychological analysis of prevalent rumors, aimed at increasing public understanding of the psychological motives underlying the spread of different types of rumor. The column was also distributed to high schools and posted on community bulletin boards, with the expectation that such measures would promote public understanding of rumor in wartime. In addition to counteracting rumors, members of the clinic were often also responsible for classifying and analyzing rumor data, distributing flyers, gauging public opinion, and giving speeches on wartime rumor spreading.

In the first column of the Boston Herald Rumor Clinic, rumors were reported to the Clinic by “official agencies”; by the following Sunday, however, the Clinic had begun receiving and analyzing rumors sent in by readers. All readers were encouraged to provide rumors, with the only stipulation being that they must sign their names; anonymous rumors would not be considered. By the third week, the Clinic had received more rumors than they had time or space to analyze (“The rumor clinic,“ 1942b). Rumors ranged from the simplistic and common to the elaborate and eccentric. The most common rumors analyzed in the Herald were those pertaining to waste of rationed materials, government dishonesty and corruption, mistreatment of American soldiers, the imminence of defeat or victory, and the future value of war bonds. Unusual or less feasible rumors were also considered, including a story circulating about glass or poison being found in crabmeat packed in Japan (The rumor clinic, 1942d) and a story about a woman employed at a shell filing factory whose head exploded after receiving a permanent at the local beauty parlor (The rumor clinic, 1942c). These latter types of anecdotes received less attention in the column, but appeared periodically amid a sea of more common rumors, such as those regarding rationing and corruption.

Refutations of these rumors came from various community officials and experts, as well as from members of the Clinic’s editorial board. The editorial board consisted of individuals from a variety of professions and included lawyers, law-enforcement officials, and academics. Much of the work of the Boston Clinic, however, was centered at Harvard due to Robert Knapp’s involvement. Knapp was completing his Ph.D. under Allport at Harvard and had been put in charge of the Division of Propaganda Research, a section of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. Knapp’s division became primarily responsible for the analysis of wartime rumor (McCormick, 1942), and his involvement further stimulated Gordon Allport’s interest in the topic, prompting him to serve on the editorial board of the Boston Clinic.

In June, Knapp and Allport increased the flow of rumors to the Clinic by appointing “morale wardens” solely for the purpose of noting and reporting rumors prevalent in the community. In a letter addressed to these morale wardens, Knapp (1942b) described the morale warden as “a person of sound judgment and high intelligence … The morale warden is not a spy or a police officer. His job is to report facts relating to public opinion, rumor, and propaganda.” The wardens were told that they must report all rumors heard to the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, fill out questionnaires on their impressions of public opinion, distribute pamphlets and posters, and engage in any other activities that might serve to “check the spread of Axis inspired rumors.” The morale wardens were also to be responsible for posting the Boston Rumor Clinic column on local bulletin boards. Through this appeal, Knapp recruited approximately three hundred wardens, all of whom gathered common rumors heard in their day-to-day activities. Throughout 1942, the flow of rumors to the clinic was also increased by a plea to the public in the Boston Herald, urging them to “join in the war on Axis rumors” by becoming a rumor warden and reporting false rumors to the clinic (“The rumor clinic,” 1942c).

The Boston Rumor Clinic also became more visible during the month of September when Knapp began planning a major survey pertaining to patterns of wartime rumor. In order to collect a sufficiently large number of rumors, Knapp printed articles regarding the Boston Clinic in Reader’s Digest and American Mercury and closed these articles with a request to the public to send in any rumors they had heard:

Send in your rumors! What wild, damaging, morale-eroding stories similar to those described in this article are current in your community? Readers who wish to help the Boston Rumor Clinic, and further the organization of similar clinics throughout the country, are urged to put such stories in writing and send them to Robert H. Knapp. (McCormick, 1942, p. 92)

This appeal generated a great response from the public, providing Knapp and Allport with several hundreds of reply letters (Katz, 1942f) and approximately 1100 rumors for classification and analysis (Knapp, n.d.). This appeal to the public combined with the eventual publication of the survey results generated a flurry of interest in the study of rumor and in rumor clinics more specifically. Upon publication of the Reader’s Digest article, Knapp and Allport received over 150 requests for advice on the set-up and operation of rumor clinics (Allport & Veltfort, 1943), and by October of 1942, clinics had been established in San Francisco, Philadelphia, New York City, Long Island, Syracuse, New Jersey, South Carolina, Florida, Ohio, Chicago, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Missouri, Montreal, Oregon, and Washington (Horowitz, 1942c). Indeed, rumor clinics had become one of the most prominent modes of civilian participation in the war effort. In addition to the clinics that were being headed by social scientists, women’s organizations began to organize rumor clinics (“Commando units,” 1942), as did various high schools and college and university clubs (“Buffalo to form,” 1942; “College students,” 1942).

The Battle Over Expertise: The OWI and the Boston Rumor Clinic

As the Boston Clinic began to gain popularity, the OFF was undergoing major organizational changes. Specifically, in June of 1942, the OFF, along with the Office of Emergency Management, the Office of Government Reports, the Foreign Information Service, and the Bureau of Intelligence, were absorbed into a new organization under the guidance of Elmer Davis: the OWI. While other agencies such as the Office of Strategic Services dealt with information concerning enemy countries, the OWI was responsible for overseeing all wartime information circulated in the United States (Feller, 1943; Winkler, 1978).

The rumor work that had been underway in the OFF carried forward into the newly formed OWI. The organization, however, encountered several difficulties along the way, not the smallest of which was the increasing popularity of the Boston Clinic and the multitude of other clinics that it had inspired. The Boston Clinic continued to gain the support of the general public and Knapp’s survey provided social scientists with a practical portrait of wartime rumor; the OWI, on the other hand, faltered in their rumor work, constructing large-scale studies that often yielded little usable information.

A major study of this sort was launched by the Bureau of Intelligence shortly after the OFF had dismissed the Rumor Clinic Project. Throughout the summer of 1942, the newly formed OWI began collecting rumors nationwide via government representatives in various locations across the United States (Joint Planning Project Committee on Rumor, 1942; Katz, 1942c). The study was quite elaborate, involving the Office of Government Reports, the Surveys Division, Polls and Surveys field staff, the Columbia Broadcasting Service, Media and Sources, and many civilian volunteers who were directed to be “rumor conscious” for one week. These volunteers were handpicked and supervised by field staff of the Office of Government Reports. They were chosen based on their standing in the community and the breadth of their interaction with the public. Dentists or barbers, for example, were considered excellent rumor reporters, given their constant interaction with the public and, thus, their high probability of overhearing repeated rumors. These volunteers were serving solely as data-collectors; they were not involved in the subsequent analysis of the rumors. Rather, they were simply given rumor report sheets, on which they were to give a verbatim report of the rumor, the exact location in which it was overheard, and a precise description of the “rumormonger.” The idea behind recruiting civilian “rumor spotters” was to obtain a more accurate picture of common rumors than that which would be obtained via government officials (Joint Planning Project Committee on Rumor, 1942).

By mid-August, 3,000 rumors had been collected from many areas across the United States. Rumors were grouped by theme and received a validity code, a dispersion code, and a frequency code (“Rumor data sheet,” 1942). The study, however, provided little in the way of tangible results. Describing the outcome, one of the project coordinators wrote:

The analysis so far makes quite clear that it would be futile to attempt a quantitative study of the present rumor material. People’s conceptions of rumor differed, they were not reported verbatim, in different sections of the country different circles within the community were tapped for the rumors, and at the present time there is no comparable base from which a statistical evaluation would be meaningful (Horowitz, 1942a).

Data sheets from the study indeed portray a multitude of different rumors, loosely categorized and, given the sheer number, largely overwhelming (“Rumor data sheet,” 1942). While it was suggested that the study be considered merely a “pilot” attempt, this was the last large-scale rumor project that the OWI would conduct.

Throughout the summer of 1942 and continuing into the fall, the OWI had continuous correspondence with Robert Knapp and Gordon Allport. Knapp sent the OWI a number of documents outlining the Harvard procedures and findings pertaining to wartime rumor (Kane, 1942b; Knapp, 1942c). He also informed them of the work of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, which prompted the interest of the OWI (Katz, 1942b). After this initial correspondence, Knapp (1942d) began sending the OWI all of the rumors reported to the Committee by their newly appointed morale wardens. The OWI continued to solicit the Committee’s aid and requested a face-to-face meeting with Knapp in Boston or Washington. The relationship between the two groups was quite amicable at this stage, with the OWI attempting to procure Knapp and Allport access to Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service reports (Katz, 1942e) and also attempting to meet their request for war trophies to be displayed in Boston (Katz, 1942d). This increasing collaboration between the two groups prompted Allport (1942a) to suggest that the OWI implement a national rumor counteraction program centered out of Boston and directed by the Harvard group. This proposal, however, was quickly turned down (Katz, 1942f).

Relations between the two parties, however, remained collaborative until October of 1942, when the OWI prepared a confidential report on rumors in wartime. As was the case with other OWI documents, the report was sent to Allport for critique and commentary. Allport’s response was less than favorable. In his reply, he critiqued the abstract and diffuse nature of the document, stating that it contained no concrete plans for rumor work (Allport, 1942b). He also expressed great disapproval of the lack of discussion pertaining to the control of rumor and the work of the Boston group and challenged specific statements regarding the limited utility of local counteraction campaigns: “Since, in point of fact, some localities … have proceeded so much further in efforts at rumor control than have Washington agencies, I think a report on these decentralized operations is in order.” Near the end of the letter, Allport accused the OWI of taking too much liberty with the work of the Harvard group: “several sentences and paragraphs in the Report are taken verbatim from Knapp’s various communications … I am surprised that the acknowledgment of sources makes no mention whatever of his contributions.”

Allport closed the letter with a list of concrete suggestions for the OWI, all of which centered on promotion and support of local counteraction groups. He suggested that the OWI familiarize themselves with the local groups, include such groups in future rumor work, and offer them small subsidies. Allport also suggested, “that help be given these organizations, but that cumbersome ’coordination’ and ’supervision’ be avoided. Isn’t it true that certain of these organizations are ahead of Washington in many respects?”

Allport’s harsh assessment of the rumor report did not have much influence in the OWI. When Allport’s assessment was passed along to Kane, it was described as “tangential” and it was described as a result of Allport’s “vested interest in the Boston Clinic” (Katz, 1942i). The critique was therefore not passed along to any of the committees involved in rumor study. In their reply to Allport, however, the OWI assured him that they “deplore the omission of credit to Knapp in the release” and that a rewrite would mention both Knapp and the Boston Clinic (Katz, 1942h). They thanked Allport for “the trouble you have taken to put us on the right track—one which I assure you we will make every effort to follow.” Despite this cordial reply, communication and collaboration between the OWI and the Harvard group came to a halt and the OWI again set their sights on gaining control of the clinics.

Allport’s criticism was the final straw for the OWI. The Rumor Clinic Project, which had begun as a potentially collaborative effort only eight months earlier, was no longer a feasible option. The power struggle between the Harvard group and the OWI only amplified previous concerns regarding the potentially haphazard dissemination of information by social scientists. Information was a valuable commodity and the OWI was unwilling to leave it in the hands of academics. They also continued to assert that carelessness or lack of foresight in rumor counteraction could lead to widened distribution of rumors. Complicating matters further, psychologists like Allport and Knapp viewed themselves as the foremost experts on rumor and were therefore expecting far more authority on rumor study and rumor control than the OWI was willing to give them; for the OWI, psychologists were simply skilled data collectors. These concerns regarding security of information on the part of the OWI, combined with the dissatisfaction on the part of Allport and Knapp proved fatal; throughout October of 1942, the OWI launched a concerted effort to bury the now prevalent clinics.

The OWI began attempting to harness the clinics by formulating a rumor policy. Many rumor groups continued to seek guidance and financial support from the OWI, thus providing the agency with an opportunity to bring the projects back under government control. The OWI therefore decided that they would begin offering “cool encouragement” to clinics and that such encouragement would be given in the form of a set of specific instructions that would inform the clinics on how to gather rumors and relay them to Washington (Katz, 1942g). The OWI also decided to compose an extended statement regarding “Rumor in Wartime” to clarify their position on rumor clinics.

The Rumor Clinic statement denigrated the role of the clinics in counteraction, and specifically pinpointed the Boston group. The OWI acknowledged the widespread appeal of the Boston Clinic and then went on to note: “while better than nothing, this approach is NOT the best … While it may have the best of motives, it still represents for the reader one of a number of ’features.’” (Horowitz, 1942b,). The rumor clinic approach was characterized as being superficial, focusing on counteraction without concentrating on the motivations underlying the spread of rumor. The memorandum closed with a firm declaration that all rumor work should be conducted under government guidance: “A large number of independent groups all scouting for the prevailing rumors and developing their own programs of counteraction would probably do more harm than good.” A more coordinated approach, conducted under the guidance of the OWI was then recommended.

Over the next several weeks, the OWI began creating extensive guidelines for the establishment and operation of rumor clinics. As the letters requesting aid continued to pour in from various rumor groups, the OWI responded by stating that they would receive full government cooperation, given that the group would run their organization by a set of guidelines that would be sent out shortly. By the end of October, the OWI had prepared a manual outlining procedures for rumor study. The manual outlined procedures to be followed in regards to rumor reporters (what Knapp was calling “morale wardens”), the role of the clinic research director, the role of the government, analyses of data, handling of collected rumors, strict guidelines for counteraction, and the role of the media in rumor campaigns. Included was an organization chart that pictorially presented the desired set-up for local clinics, outlining the direct roles of the OWI, the project director, the local community, rumor wardens, and other project staff members.

At the same time that this manual was completed, the OWI also drew up a form letter and questionnaire to be sent to all individuals expressing interest in setting up a clinic. The letter made note of the new manual and indicated that it would be sent to interested parties upon their completion of an attached questionnaire. The questionnaire contained approximately 30 questions regarding the sponsorship and supervision of the clinic, the staff set-up, and financial support. OWI correspondence makes it clear, however, that the questionnaire was designed not to elicit information, but rather to discourage the clinics. The purpose of the questionnaire was described as being “to ask so many and so elaborate questions as to discourage rumor clinics … For the more energetic local groups who whether [sic] the questionnaire, a ’rumor bible’ is being prepared by Special Services. It will be a long discussion, perhaps even longer than the original wartime rumor report assembling all the do’s and don’ts about rumor analysis and rumor refutation” (Katz, 1942j). The OWI was attempting to overwhelm the clinics by burying their efforts in a mountain of red tape. This tactic allowed the OWI to hinder the progress of the clinics while appearing as though they were supporting them.

The “rumor bible” that would be sent out upon completion of the questionnaires was a convoluted, 30-page description of how clinics should be set up and how they should cooperate with the government (Horowitz, n.d.). This document makes it clear that community clinics would need to make major changes in exchange for government support. The document outlined a bureaucratic structure for the clinics, whereby a clinic is organized under a “project director” who communicates with a “general advisory council.” A research director is also necessary, and this director is to work through “field reporters” and “analytical assistants.” Finally, the “educational director” works through an “advisory council of specialists.” Extensive details regarding the collection of rumors and the desirable characteristics of rumor reporters were also provided. Superfluous descriptions of the analysis of rumors were also included in the “bible,” outlining the processing, sorting, and classification of all rumors sent to clinics. Specific rules for counteraction were provided; for example, rumors with two parts should not be counteracted, nor should lengthy rumors or rumors that have no kernel of truth. Those that are partially true can be counteracted occasionally, but only with great care. Counteraction of anxiety-motivated rumors as well as rumors expressing prejudice should also be avoided.

The “rumor bible” also directly addressed some of the practices of the Boston group, which had become the prototype for many other clinics (Horowitz, n.d.). The OWI advised against labeling rumors as rumors in the columns “since it may tend to increase public anxiety… . By calling a silly story a ’rumor’ you automatically lend it dignity.” Furthermore, they suggested that such columns should not be called “Rumor Column” or “Rumor Clinic.” In a section titled “Illustrative Material,” examples from the Boston Herald and other clinics were provided, in order to demonstrate the errors commonly made by clinics in their attempts at rumor refutation. Corrective procedures were outlined and local groups were repeatedly warned against the error of inadvertently perpetuating rather than preventing the spread of rumor.

Allport and Knapp, however, were unwilling to have the OWI determine the organization and structure of the clinics. While the OWI was preparing and distributing their guidelines, Allport and Knapp (1942) were preparing guidelines of their own. Their regulations, titled “Standards for Agencies working on The Prevention and Control of Rumor,” were much briefer than that provided by the OWI and made the implementation of rumor clinics seem much more practical. The document included a brief outline of the staff set-up, a short bibliography of academic readings related to rumor, and some basic guidelines for rumor refutation. These guidelines were circulated widely among university and college clinics seeking advice (Allport & Postman, 1947).

Animosity between the OWI and the clinics continued right up until the time when the clinics began to dissipate. In January of 1943, the OWI reported that over 40 clinics were still in operation. In a New York Times article, the agency continued to publicly challenge the utility of the clinics, stating that the “rumor-spiking department of the war information agency lives in constant dread that some of the [clinics] are going to make a rumor worse by printing it and denying it in the wrong manner” (“The War on Lies,” 1943, p. 35). While the struggle between the OWI and the clinics continued, interest in rumor began to wane. The popularity and prevalence of the clinics began to dwindle throughout 1943, when wartime rumor also began to subside. According to Allport and Postman (1947), newspaper editors began to lose interest in the columns and the number of rumors being reported to the clinics steadily declined. The clinics therefore began to print fewer rumors with the passing months, until the columns no longer appeared. While the psychological study of rumor continued to be a topic of moderate interest to social scientists (Fine, Campion-Vincent, & Heath, 2005; Rosnow, 1980, 1991; Shibutani, 1966), the rumor clinics themselves became a remnant of social psychology’s past.

Reassessing World War II Social Psychology

Two years after the end of the Second World War, Gordon Allport reflected on the study of rumor during the war, describing the disparity of the approaches taken by the OWI and the local rumor clinics:

The OWI’s philosophy held that to smother a rumor with facts is better than to single it out for disproof, lest in the process it become unduly advertised. The rumor clinic philosophy leaned in the opposite direction. People won’t see the relevance of facts unless it is pointed out to them. Name the rumor and pound it hard was the policy. (Allport & Postman, 1947, p. 15)

According to Allport and Postman, the OWI was highly concerned with “fifth-column” rumors and security of information; the clinics, on the other hand, were concerned with the effect of local rumors on civilian morale. While Allport noted that “both agencies perhaps erred in placing too much faith in facts” (p. 15), he held that the clinics were much more successful at controlling prevalent local rumors that eroded civilian morale. Allport’s discussion of wartime rumor study is brief and balanced, outlining both the successes and failures of the clinics and the OWI. The majority of the book, however, is devoted to the presentation and analysis of experimental rumor research.

An examination of World War II rumor research suggests, however, that the two groups held divergent opinions on more than just their approach to the study of rumor. The OFF and later the OWI indeed saw the value in social-psychological research on rumor; they were not willing, however, to relinquish control over the application of that research. Social scientists were viewed as social technicians, primarily responsible for data collection. Indeed, some of the most amicable collaborations between social scientists and the government functioned in precisely this manner. As is clear in the case of rumor research, many social scientists viewed their role quite differently. They considered their field of expertise as one that extended into the application of social-psychological research. They were not content to gather information for the government; rather, they wanted to gather the information and also oversee and contribute to the ways in which it was put to use. While psychologists saw themselves as experts, and perhaps even as mediators between the government and the public, the government viewed psychologists as a skilled subset of the general public. In the case of World War II rumor work, this difference of opinion regarding the precise role of social scientists proved to be insurmountable.

As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the role of academics in the war effort was indeed a complex one. Some academics were called upon to fill duties for which they were perhaps inadequately trained. Such was the case with many of the leaders within the Office of Facts and Figures, such as Archibald MacLeish, whose oratory skills landed him a position that in fact required a great deal of administrative proficiency. Others found themselves working within the confines of Washington agencies, a situation which provided governmental sanction for their work, but also placed restraints on the scope of that work. Such was the situation with figures like R. C. Tryon and F. H. Sanford, whose roles as representatives of the OCI seemed to provide them with the liberty of proposing multiple projects, but never gave them the liberty of having the final say on those projects. Finally, others, like Gordon Allport, attempted to collaborate with government agencies while remaining within the walls of the university, a situation that tested the compatibility of the aims of eager social scientists and the aims of a government faced by international crisis. Indeed, the situation was not simply one in which social science was pitted against the government; rather, the boundaries between the two groups were fluid and overlapping, a situation that led to much ambiguity and, consequently, also led to a continuous struggle over expertise.

The difficulties encountered by Robert Knapp and Gordon Allport in their study of wartime rumor suggest that wartime social psychology was indeed a rather cumbersome enterprise. Such a view is further exemplified by additional incidents that occurred during this time. Goodwin Watson’s conflict with the Federal Communications Commission serves as an apt example (Nicholson, 1997), as does Gordon Allport’s repeated, yet failed, attempts to achieve government recognition and support for the social-psychological study of morale (Parkovnick, 1998). Such experiences suggest that social scientists were faced with a host of difficulties during the war. Most notably, they were faced with the task of negotiating their multiple and often shifting identities as citizens, scientists, social technicians, and social commentators. The frequent futility of their efforts in this domain suggests that our current view of a successful, harmonious wartime social psychology may be best supplemented by another view, one that comprehensively addresses the political and practical struggles that were a reality for many social psychologists during the Second World War.

Footnotes

1  This article relies primarily on documents obtained from the World War II Rumor Project Collection, housed in the Archive of Folk Culture at the Library of Congress. The collection covers the period from January of 1942 to December of 1942 and consists of correspondence, memoranda, and data pertaining to rumor study and rumor control within the OFF and the OWI. While a portion of the materials are documents outlining the various proposals and projects pertaining to rumor, the majority of the collection consists of a sizeable assortment of the various rumors collected from numerous sources throughout 1942. A more in-depth description of the collection can be found at http://www.loc.gov/folklife/guides/rumors.html.

2  The prevalence of rumors in other parts of the world during the war undoubtedly increased the U.S. government’s concerns regarding rumor and their desire to get it under control as quickly as possible (“Balkan fear rises,” 1941; “Rumors laid to Italians,” 1941; “Warns of false rumors,” 1941). Prior to U.S. entry into the war, rumor had become a topic of much discussion; indeed, in some countries, rumor spreading was deemed an offence punishable by imprisonment (“Rumor-Spreaders Interned,” 1941; “Soviet to jail rumor mongers,” 1941).

3  The OFF was established in October of 1941 under Archibald MacLeish to ensure that proper information about the government and the American defense effort was made available to the American public and that the public received as many facts about the war as was possible (Kane, 1942).

4  In a 1942 article in Reader’s Digest (McCormick, 1942), the author indicates that the idea for the clinics arose in February of 1942, largely as the result of Gordon Allport’s efforts. Similarly, Knapp (1944) indicates that the idea was “inspired” by Allport. However, correspondence in the Library of Congress files indicates that the idea had already reached the government in one way or another as early as January of that year. It is quite possible, however, that the clinics were originally the idea of social scientists. In November of 1941, the Emergency Committee in Psychology met to discuss and coordinate research needs during wartime. Among those present was Gordon Allport as well as two representatives of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI): R. C. Tryon and F. H. Sanford (Parkovnick, 1998). While the report proposing rumor clinics to the Office of Facts and Figures was not written by psychologists, several psychologists, in addition to Tryon and Sanford, were working for the OCI (Marquis, 1944). Thus, it is feasible that the idea for the rumor clinics, presented to the OFF by the OCI, may have been developed at least in part by psychologists.

5  The Office of Education was established in 1867 to research and report on the condition of education in the United States. During the war, the agency, headed by J. W. Studebaker, took on a myriad of duties, including serving as a liaison between the schools, colleges, and the universities, and the U. S. government. Studebaker, a lawyer by training, took on the position of Commissioner of the Office of Education in 1934 (Studebaker, 1942a).

6  The Office of the Coordinator of Information was established on July 11, 1941 with William J. Donovan as head. It was set up as a civilian office attached to the White House and was created with the purpose of collecting and assembling all information and data that may have any bearing upon America’s national security. The Office was later absorbed into the Office of Strategic Services (Winkler, 1978).

7  The Bureau of Intelligence, originally a division of the OFF, was later absorbed into the Office of War Information. It would become one of the most central agencies in the study of wartime rumor. Its purpose was to “point out the areas of confusion, misunderstanding or disaffection toward the correction of which informational efforts must be directed, and to define the popular ideals toward the realization of which administrative efforts must be attuned” (Barth, 1943, p. 66).

8  Throughout the 1940s, DuBois was the head of a market research firm, Cornelius DuBois & Company in New York. In the course of his work in marketing, he conducted a fair amount of work on attitudes and attitude measurement (Dubois, 1949).

9  Kane was a Harvard graduate, trained as a lawyer. He had a legal practice until 1940, when he became the assistant to the Attorney General of the United States (Kane, 1942a).

10  Allport, along with Leo Postman, would eventually go on to formulate what became known as the “basic law of rumor.” Rumor, Allport and Postman (1947) argued, may be understood by a simple formula, r = i × a, meaning that the intensity of a given rumor varies systematically as a function of two things: importance and ambiguity. This “law” was popular in the psychological literature, but also became the target of much criticism (Chorus, 1954; Nkpa, 1975; Peterson & Gist, 1951; Schacter & Burdick, 1956).

11  A full report of the results was not published until the spring of 1944 (Knapp, 1944). However, outlines of the findings and explanations of Knapp’s rumor classification scheme appeared in the Boston Herald (“The rumor clinic,” 1942d) as well as in a memorandum circulated among social scientists (see Harvard University Department of Psychology, n.d.).

12  Requests for guidance came from a variety of groups including universities and colleges, the Bartenders International League of America, state defense councils, newspaper editors, and high schools.

13  It is not clear whether rumor groups set up their operations in accordance with OWI standards or the standards of the Boston group. The OWI rumor files, however, contain no evidence of completed questionnaires from local groups. In fact, it would seem that the “rumor bible” and the questionnaires created by the OWI had the desired effect; after this, the flow of requests from local groups came to a halt.

14  This document was also later published in Allport and Postman (1947). It is interesting to note that in these guidelines, a psychologist or psychiatrist must serve on the advisory board; psychologists with a firm knowledge of social or abnormal behavior are particularly essential. It seems that while the OWI was asserting its expertise as being over and above that of psychologists, psychologists were simultaneously asserting their expertise as being over and above that of the general public.

15  As it would turn out, rumor refutation had only been temporarily laid to rest. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, attempts to control rumors arising from racial tensions led to the establishment of several rumor control centers and rumor hotlines. In 1968, the government held a conference in Chicago to evaluate the effectiveness of rumor control centers and by 1974, a set of standards and guidelines for the institution and operation of these centers had been compiled by the Department of Justice (Rosnow & Fine, 1976). Research conducted by Knopf (1975) indicates that at least 97 American cities have at one time operated a rumor control center. An interesting summary of the implementation of rumor control centers and the difficulty that such centers have obtaining funding and establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the public is provided by Ponting (1973). Such centers are now quite rare, although they do occasionally appear in times of crisis (Rohter, 1992; Witkin, Tharp, & Guttman, 1993).

16  Rensis Likert’s work in the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Program Surveys is an example of this type of collaboration (see Capshew, 1999) as is Hadley Cantril’s public opinion research conducted for President Roosevelt (see Casey, 2001).

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Submitted: January 16, 2006 Revised: July 7, 2006 Accepted: August 6, 2006