Defence without deterrence: India's strategy in the 1965 war.
In: Journal of Strategic Studies, Jg. 46 (2023-02-01), Heft 1, S. 150-179
Online
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Zugriff:
Why does combat success sometimes fail to produce a stable and durable post-war settlement? In the 1965 war, India successfully defended against a Pakistani invasion, but did not improve the long-term security of Kashmir or establish deterrence against Pakistan. I argue that, to deter rivals after war, states must couple battlefield success with credible signals of resolve, such as retaining captured territory or risking a wider war. In 1965, India used both denial and punishment strategies, but both failed to establish post-war deterrence because it judged the necessary signals of resolve to be too costly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Titel: |
Defence without deterrence: India's strategy in the 1965 war.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Tarapore, Arzan |
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Zeitschrift: | Journal of Strategic Studies, Jg. 46 (2023-02-01), Heft 1, S. 150-179 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2023 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0140-2390 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1080/01402390.2019.1668274 |
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