Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets.
In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Jg. 74 (2015-03-01), S. 8-12
Online
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Zugriff:
In this note, we investigate the relationship between the classical concepts of maximin and minimax, which were originally defined in the context of zero-sum games in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) , and the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) farsighted stable set using the indirect domination defined in Chwe (1994). We show two main results for two-player games: an existence result and an almost-uniqueness result. Under a mild assumption, we show that any strategy profile that is Pareto efficient and strictly individually rational–that is, strictly above each player’s maximin value–is generically a singleton vNM farsighted stable set. Moreover, there does not exist a vNM farsighted stable set that includes a strategy profile that is strictly individually rational and yields a payoff greater than the minimax value for a player, but not Pareto efficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Titel: |
Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets.
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Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | Kawasaki, Ryo |
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Zeitschrift: | Mathematical Social Sciences, Jg. 74 (2015-03-01), S. 8-12 |
Veröffentlichung: | 2015 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
ISSN: | 0165-4896 (print) |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.12.003 |
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